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Since Duncan Watts and Steve Strogatz published “Collective Dynamics of Small-World Networks” in Nature in 1998, 
there has been an explosion of interest in mathematical models of large networks, leading to numerous research papers 
and books. These works have given us new measures of large networks including hub nodes, broker nodes, connection 
path length, small-world phenomena, six degrees of separation, power laws of connectivity, and scale-free networks. 
The National Research Council carried out a study evaluating the emergence of a new area called “network science,” 
which could provide the mathematics and experimental methods for characterizing, predicting, and designing 
networks. 
 
The new area has its share of controversies. An example is whether the power law distribution of number of nodes of 
given connectivity leads to valid conclusions for real networks. The power law distribution predicts that the network 
will have hubs—a few nodes with high connectivity—and has led to the claim that such networks are vulnerable to 
attacks against the hubs. The Internet has been reported to follow power law connectivity but its design resists hub 
failures. How might we explain this anomaly? 
 
David Alderson has become a leading advocate for formulating the foundations of network science so that its 
predictions can be applied to real networks. He is an assistant professor in the Operations Research Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., where he conducts research with military officer-students on the 





In Search of the Real Network Science:  
An Interview with David Alderson 
 
 
UBIQUITY: Most people think a network is a bunch of nodes and connections. Is that how you 
see them? 
 
DAVID ALDERSON: The nodes-and-connections idea comes from the mathematical definition of 
a graph, which we typically define as a set of vertices (also called nodes) and edges (also called 
arcs or links). In the three centuries since the time of Leonhard Euler, the study of graphs has 
been an important part of mathematics. 
 
UBIQUITY: Can graphs represent networks? 
 
ALDERSON: I think it’s important to distinguish network from graph. A network consists of a 
graph plus additional data interpreting the nodes and arcs. These data are typically domain-
specific and often critical to the definition of the system and its function. For example, a graph 
representing the connectivity of a communication network tells only part of the story—one would 
need additional data such as the bandwidths of the links and the queuing capacities of the nodes 
if one wanted to understand even the simplest behavior of the system. While a graph is always 
present in a network, it is not enough to define a network. 
 
These differences allow us to distinguish an electric power grid different from a gene regulatory 
system or a social network. The network is a complete system. The connectivity depicted in the 
graph is not enough to tell us what the system does or to help us predict how the system will 
behave in the future. 
 
UBIQUITY: Graphs might explain why mathematicians are interested in networks … but why 
scientists? 
 
ALDERSON: Scientists are always interested in models or representations that help them to 
understand, explain, and predict the world around us. The scientific approach complements and 
enables the engineering and mathematical approaches for complex systems. Mathematicians 
give us precise language for describing the laws of systems and deriving equations about the 
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future behavior of those systems. Engineers design and build systems within real constraints. All 
three perspectives are essential for the advancement of knowledge and technology. 
 
UBIQUITY: So might I summarize that as Science models, Mathematics proves, and Engineering 
designs? 
 
ALDERSON: That’s right. They all need each other. For example, the growing size and 
complexity of the Internet in recent years has defied the mathematicians and engineers to predict 
its growth and evolution. Scientists have flocked to the study of the Internet and are trying to 
provide models that mathematicians make precise and engineers use for design. I am a scientist 
with an engineering background, so it appeals to me on more than one level. 
 
UBIQUITY: Was there a “defining event” that told you to devote yourself to the study and 
understanding of networks? 
 
ALDERSON: In the late 1990s as a graduate student, I had the opportunity to participate in 
workshops supporting the U.S. Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(PCCIP). This group included leaders from industry, academia, and government who were 
concerned that the growing interconnectivity of our critical infrastructures, and in particular their 
dependence on the Internet, could lead to new national security vulnerabilities. Throughout these 
meetings, there was a general recognition that we had insufficient scientific understanding of 
these systems. 
 
UBIQUITY: Is that what motivated you to study critical infrastructure networks? 
 
ALDERSON: It certainly reinforced it. Our infrastructure systems (electric power, 
telecommunications, transportation, etc.) are the fabric of our modern world. These ubiquitous 
“conveniences” are critical to our economic and social welfare. Most of these systems were 
developed and deployed in isolation, but they are now all interconnected in ways that we often 
don’t appreciate until something goes wrong. I worry about a large-scale disruption caused by 
accidental failure, natural disaster, or intentional attack. 
 
UBIQUITY: Isn’t network science much bigger than a study of infrastructure systems? 
 
ALDERSON: It sure is. We live in an era of Google, Facebook, and Twitter, a time of explosive 
connectivity. Massive data sets are now being integrated. Footprints of social relationships are 
everywhere. And we are finding networks in the structures and behaviors of living systems, from 
the smallest genetic systems to the largest ecosystems. Scientists are responding to the call to 
understand these extremely large systems. 
 
UBIQUITY: And what have network scientists accomplished so far? 
 
ALDERSON: Scientists look for recurring patterns that can be observed in the structure or 
behavior of systems and then derive and validate models based on those recurrences. Since all 
networks have an underlying graph structure, a natural starting point was to focus on observed 
patterns in graph connectivity and models that attempt to explain them. In the last decade, there 
have been a plethora of scientific and popular publications on this topic. 
 
UBIQUITY: The term “power law” comes up a lot in discussions about networks. Why? 
 
ALDERSON: Power laws in connectivity were one of the patterns observed repeatedly in recent 
empirical studies of networks of all kinds. In power law distributions, most nodes have very few 
connections while a few have orders of magnitude more. 
 
UBIQUITY: Why all the fuss about power laws? 
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ALDERSON: Power laws are natural and ubiquitous, showing up in everything ranging from 
income distributions to earthquake magnitudes. Power laws had been studied in detail in the 
1950s and 1960s and were rediscovered in networks during the last decade. In physics, power 
laws are closely associated with phase transitions, which are rather exotic phenomena. So some 
researchers interpreted the ubiquity of power laws in networks as evidence of a broader, 
universal force at work in complex systems. The study of power laws in large networks became a 
cottage industry. 
 
UBIQUITY: Power laws are special! 
 
ALDERSON: Actually, they aren’t special at all. They can arise as natural consequences of 
aggregation of high variance data. You know from statistics that the Central Limit Theorem says 
distributions of data with limited variability tend to follow the Normal (bell-shaped, or Gaussian) 
curve. There is a less well-known version of the theorem that shows aggregation of high (or 
infinite) variance data leads to power laws. Thus, the bell curve is normal for low-variance data 
and the power law curve is normal for high-variance data. In many cases, I don’t think anything 
deeper than that is going on.  
 
In fact, lots of mechanisms can produce power laws, so the presence of a power law by itself 
does not imply anything about the process that led to it. And remember that we are talking about 
connectivity only (i.e., the graph) and not the full network as a system, so power laws provide only 
a crude description from the outset. I think power laws have been a big distraction.  
 
UBIQUITY: You have been a critic of some of the contemporary network science research. Is this 
research leading us to false conclusions about designing resilient and dependable networks? 
 
ALDERSON: Some of the early work in network science suggested that power laws yield rules of 
thumb such as “protect the parts with the most connections.” In a graph, removal of highly 
connected nodes can break the graph into isolated pieces. We would not want that for the 
Internet or any critical infrastructure. In the real Internet, Google has a huge number of 
connections … but if for some reason Google failed, the Internet would still function. The “pure 
graph” interpretation of the Internet leads to a false conclusion of fragility. There are loads of 
similar examples. That rule of thumb is misleading and potentially dangerous. If I were applying it 
to critical infrastructure, I would personally worry that I might be putting my limited protective 
resources in the wrong place. 
 
UBIQUITY: Why? What’s the problem? 
 
ALDERSON: The basic conceptual problem is a failure to distinguish between graph and 
network. The graph may have nodes with lots of connections, often called “hubs,” but the network 
may be designed so that the failure of hubs is not an issue. The backbone of the Internet is 
designed by engineers in a mesh structure that guarantees many redundant paths in case of a 
node or link failure. If there is a single point of failure, it typically results in a disruption to local 
connectivity only and does not affect the Internet as a whole. 
 
UBIQUITY: But aren’t these scientific studies based on connectivity data for real networks? 
 
ALDERSON: Yes, but how one defines a “connection” in a network may not be unique. For 
example, much of the work in network science about the Internet is based on “Traceroute data.” 
Traceroute is an Internet program that sends probe packets and reports a list of the Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses that they visit. Addresses adjacent in the list need not have a physical 
connection between them. The network defined by IP connectivity is a virtual network. Therefore, 
the connectivity observed by Traceroute gives us limited, and sometimes misleading, information 
about the physical structure of connections among routers. What appears to be a hub in the 
traceroute graph may not be a hub in the real network. 
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The same thing is true with data about connections among web pages. It appears that Google 
(for example) is a huge hub. But in reality, Google has implemented a worldwide “cloud” of 
servers that present the Google interface to users. The “cloud” is a carefully designed, highly 
redundant, fail-safe network of servers. It is only an illusion that Google is a single hub. For the 
same reason, some reports of power law connectivity patterns in the Internet were also an 
illusion. 
 
UBIQUITY: The “cloud” architecture clouds our understanding of what is actually vulnerable? 
 
ALDERSON: Correct. Almost every large Internet service is implemented with a “cloud.” A lot of 
connections within the cloud, which are measured and recorded in graphs, are virtual, not real. 
The graph we are measuring bears no resemblance to the network system behind it. This should 
not surprise us. It was an explicit objective of the Internet’s architecture to be able to support a 
diversity of virtual topologies independent of their physical implementation. 
 
UBIQUITY: So most of the connectivity we see from data is virtual and does not tell us much 
about the physical connectivity and its vulnerabilities? 
 
ALDERSON: Exactly. A simple graph representation of that connectivity is particularly misleading 
because it typically omits most of the architectural features governing the behavior of the system.  
 
UBIQUITY: And the architecture of a network is more than its connectivity? 
 
ALDERSON: Absolutely. The architecture of the Internet consists of rules, implemented as 
hardware and software protocols, that define a control system for communication. What makes 
the Internet robust or vulnerable really comes from those protocols, not from its connectivity. Most 
of the “big problems” facing the Internet—such as email spam, viruses and worms, denial of 
service attacks, etc.—come from hijacking either these protocols or other mechanisms that make 
the Internet work in the first place. Connectivity patterns of the network do not play a role. 
 
UBIQUITY: How can such failures of understanding be so widespread? 
 
ALDERSON: Because many researchers do not know about the quality of the data they use. It 
sounds crazy to say it that way, but there it is. And the Internet has exacerbated the problem by 
making it so easy to share data.  
 
UBIQUITY: The Internet has made data sharing worse? 
 
ALDERSON: Let me explain. Getting good data is hard work and requires carefully designed and 
administered experiments. Scientists that gather data put them up on the Internet for others to 
use. One data set can attract many researchers who do not want to do the data collection 
themselves. If more people had an appreciation for the distinction between a graph and a 
network, and if it were easier to assess the idiosyncrasies and limitations of an individual data set, 
then others might be more careful when using them. 
 
UBIQUITY: Some of those data sets are pretty huge, no? 
 
ALDERSON: Huge doesn’t even begin to describe their size. Many of the phenomena under 
study involve petabytes (10 to the 15 power) or more. It’s really hard to collect such data and then 
to use them wisely for solid scientific conclusions. The current academic enterprise values the 
analysis of data far more than its collection and maintenance. And yet, without detailed “meta 
information” about how the data were collected and why, determining appropriate use will be 
difficult. The meta information will connect the data to the network and distinguish it from the 
graph. 
 
UBIQUITY: What are some of the big questions on the research agenda of network science? 
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ALDERSON: There’s still a lot of work to do to connect the science with the mathematics and 
engineering, and that’s happening slowly. One largely unaddressed topic is how to model a 
network that includes a mix of automated and human processes in its control loop. A second big 
topic is how to model a network that needs to take action urgently. 
 
UBIQUITY: What’s on your research agenda? 
 
ALDERSON: I want to know how should we design, build, and manage complex systems to 
avoid “rare, yet catastrophic” failures. With critical infrastructures, we need designs that make 
them more resilient and less susceptible to disruption, both accidental and intentional. I want to 
make sure we are investing our resources wisely. 
